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Economic Loss in American Tort Law:
The Examples of J'Aire and of Products
Liability
GARY T. SCHWARTZ*
Having suggested that the application of tort doctrine to problems
of economic loss raises diverse rather than uniform issues, Profes-
sor Schwartz explores J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, a 1979 California
decision establishing a general economic loss tort, and Seely v.
White Motor Corp., a 1965 California decision refusing to extend
tort coverage to economic losses resulting from defective products.
According to Professor Schwartz, the key to J'Aire lies in clarify-
ing the relationship between the common law of torts and the com-
mon law of contracts, while the key to Seely lies in defining the
boundaries of common law and statutory law. In the end, he criti-
cizes J'Aire but commends Seely.
INTRODUCTION
How should tort doctrine be applied to losses that are solely eco-
nomic in character? This is a question that traditionally has tended
to baffle or elude tort scholars. In recent years, however, a number of
scholars have each attempted to develop a general theory to cover
* Professor, UCLA School of Law. B.A., 1962, Oberlin College; J.D., 1966,
Harvard University. I am grateful to Dante Brown for research assistance, and to Don
Harris, Bob Jordan, Jim Krier, and Matt Spitzer for helpful comments and questions.
An early version of this Article was presented at the University of Bristol at a conference
in April 1984. The papers from that conference are being published in England as TORT
LAW AND ECONOMIC Loss (M. Furmston ed. 1986).
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the* problem of tort law and economic loss.1 Yet as it happens, the
theories they have individually introduced are themselves disconcert-
ingly diverse.2
I recommend that we abandon any effort to formulate any single
general theory: for the economic loss problem, as I understand it, is
multiform rather than unitary in character. Unfair competition dif-
fers from fraud, which in turn differs from negligent misrepresenta-
tion, which in turn differs from the negligent polluting of public fish-
ing waters,8 which in turn differs from the lawyer's malpractice
liability to his client (let alone to a range of third parties), which in
turn differs from the destruction of buildings by fire,4 which in turn
differs from compensating plaintiffs for lost income in personal in-
jury suits. In many situations, although not in others, the very con-
cept of intentional infliction of harm may be rendered vacuous or
problematic by the values associated with the operation of the mar-
ketplace.5 Often, but not always, affirming a tort cause of action will
raise the specter of open-ended liability,' or of an inefficient number
of lawsuits.7 In some instances, but not in others, a regime of first-
party insurance is already in place in a way that renders a tort strat-
egy less advisable." Some of the time, but not always, there may be a
need to distinguish between the actual infliction of economic harm
and the mere withholding of economic benefits.9 On some occasions,
but not others, allowing a tort recovery would run the risk of creat-
ing unwanted cross-subsidies among the class of potential plaintiffs.10
In this Article I wish to review yet another set of reasons for being
wary of the extension of general tort principles. As one considers the
1. See, e.g., Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Economic Loss?,
23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79 (1985); Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1982); Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reas-
sessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985); Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law
of Torts, II J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982).
2. Abel's theory, for example, would deny all recoveries for economic loss, by
virtue of a combination of reasons, most of which relate to the alleged illegitimacy of the
distribution of economic welfare within our society. Abel, supra note 1. Rabin's theory,
by contrast, would generally approve of recoveries for economic loss, subject to some
concern for the imposition of disproportionately extensive aggregate liabilities. Rabin,
supra note 1.
3. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
4. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896
(1928); Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
5. See W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1012-13 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER &
KEETON].
6. See Rabin, supra note 1.
7. See Rizzo, supra note 1.
8. See Ryan, 35 N.Y. at 216.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63.
10. See Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE LJ. 1297
(1981).
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territory that economic losses cover in our legal society, one is re-
quired to recognize that much of this territory is already inhabited,
in substantial ways, by specific legal theories or doctrines. To intrude
general tort concepts would hence at least run the risk of improperly
ignoring or disparaging the authority and intelligence of these doc-
trines. To show how the deployment of tort generalizations could in-
terfere with specific tort rules, an introductory illustration can be
offered.11 The traditional torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of
process require actual showings of "malice" or "abuse," require-
ments designed to avoid any undue interference with the ordinary
processes of litigation.1 2 To affirm, under the influence of abstract
negligence principles, a party's right to sue (or countersue) for eco-
nomic losses resulting from another party's merely negligent initia-
tion of legal proceedings would both undermine the limitations built
into the malicious-prosecution and abuse-of-process torts and frus-
trate the purposes which those limitations are designed to serve.13
In J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,4 the California Supreme Court en-
deavored to create a generic tort for the negligent infliction of eco-
nomic harm. Because of the comprehensiveness of its holding, J'Aire
is an important decision. It is treated as a leading case in the Frank-
lin & Rabin coursebook 15 and as a potentially leading case in the
new edition of the Prosser treatise;16 also, its broad holding has now
been largely ratified by the New Jersey' Supreme Court.17 Yet ex-
11. A recent case suggests a second illustration. While tort law has long recog-
nized a cause of action for inducing a contractual breach through the means of making
an alternative offer, this tort has traditionally been defined as requiring that the defen-
dant act both intentionally and unjustifiably. Despite the recent emphasis on the negli-
gence concept in California law, one federal court has displayed a reluctance to relax the
improper motive element of the inducement cause of action. DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity
Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1980). This is an understandable reluctance: one
would need to think long and hard about the purposes and functions of the inducement
tort before acceding to the proposed rejection of its motive prerequisite.
12. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 5, at 882-85, 894-95, 897-900.
13. Despite the recent developments in California negligence law that are dis-
cussed below, California litigants apparently have so far declined to advance such negli-
gence suits. By virtue, however, of Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616
P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (creating a general tort for negligent infliction of
emotional distress), counterclaims are now common in which a defendant alleges that
negligent initiation of a lawsuit by a plaintiff has subjected the defendant to severe emo-
tional harm.
14. 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
15. M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 263-68 (3d ed.
1983).
16. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 5, at 1008-09.
17. People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495
A.2d 107 (1985).
actly because of J'Aire's attempt at comprehensiveness, it is an opin-
ion that is ill-advised. The previous paragraph has offered an illus-
tration of how J'Aire, if taken at full face value, could override
limitations that tort judges have long been eager to defend-judges
whose job it is to define those tort obligations that are imposed by
law. In other instances, it is the coverage of contract law, with its
concern for obligations voluntarily assumed, that J'Aire is capable of
disturbing. The next section of this Article will show how the factual
situation confronting the court in J'Aire entailed contract issues that
should not be ignored.
The final section of the Article will discuss a second problem: the
application of products liability doctrine to cases of economic loss.
The practical importance of this problem is documented by the ex-
tensiveness of the case law. Here, too, the Article will emphasize the
need for tort law to take other legal doctrines into account: in this
instance, the law of implied warranty, as codified in the Uniform
Commercial Code. Given this need, the Article will endorse the rule
of tort non-recovery suggested by the California opinion in Seely v.
White Motor Company."8 The Article will then consider-and pro-
ceed to reject as interesting but largely mistaken--certain important
exceptions that several courts have read into the Seely rule.
J'Aire: TORT AND CONTRACT
The facts of J'Aire can be adequately stated in a somewhat skele-
tal fashion. The owner of a building leased space to the tenant,
which operated a restaurant. A contractor promised the owner that
he would renovate a portion of the building that lay wholly within
the premises of the restaurant.19 The contractor was allegedly negli-
gent, however, in completing these renovations, resulting in a loss of
business to the tenant. According to the court in J'Aire, the tenant,
by demonstrating the negligence of the contractor, can secure a re-
covery in a direct tort action against the contractor.
While Professor Rabin seems strongly sympathetic to the court's
pure negligence analysis,20 I find that analysis somewhat facile. A
web of contracts is indicated by the circumstances in J'Aire, and it is
difficult to think about the role of the negligence doctrine in such a
case without first clarifying the implications of those contracts. The
first implication is obvious enough. The contractor, by failing to meet
his deadline, breached his own agreement with the owner. Under a
18. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
19. That the renovations undertaken by the contractor were exclusively located
within the restaurant is not entirely clear from the court's opinion. I have confirmed the
point, however, by speaking with the plaintiff's lawyer. Telephone interview with Tim
Crawley, Esq., lawyer for J'Aire Corp. (February 8, 1984).
20. Rabin, supra note 1.
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reasonable version of the principle in Hadley v. Baxendale, a the
contractor is hence liable to the owner for the loss of rental income
the owner suffers on account of the contractor's failure.
Second, the court's statement of the facts refers to an ongoing
lease between the owner and the tenant,22 and can be read as sug-
gesting that the contractor's delays resulted in the owner's violations
of its obligations under the lease. Indeed, a recent conversation with
the lawyer for the plaintiff in J'Aire confirms that such a violation
did in fact occur (and that he specifically advised the court of this
during oral argument).23 Accordingly, and quite without regard to
anything in the law of torts, the tenant had a contract cause of ac-
tion against the owner for business losses. Moreover, so long as the
contractor had some original awareness of the owner's lease obliga-
tions, the Hadley rule presumably would have permitted the owner
to secure reimbursement from the contractor for the liability costs
borne by the owner as a result of the tenant's claim against the
owner-a claim that itself was a consequence of the contractor's de-
lay. Why, then, was the tenant in J'Aire not content to bring a direct
and easy breach-of-lease suit against the owner, instead of choosing
to assert a legally complex claim against the contractor? Because, as
the tenant's lawyer told the court, the tenant did not wish to upset
its friendly relations with the building owner and thereby jeopardize
the continuation of the lease arrangement.2 4
The tenant's "equities" in this regard hardly seem overwhelming,
especially in light of the apparent ability of the owner to transfer
liability back to the contractor. Consider, however, the tenant-ver-
sus-owner and owner-versus-contractor combination of lawsuits.
There is a lack of economy in this combination that could be avoided
by allowing the tenant to sue the contractor directly.2 5 J'Aire does
achieve this result-but only by introducing the issue of the contrac-
tor's negligence (as discussed below). Notice, furthermore, that the
law of contracts possibly may be available as the source of a direct
suit by the tenant against the contractor. The American common
law recognizes a limited category of "intended" third-party benefi-
ciaries to a contract-beneficiaries who, although not privy to the
contract itself, nevertheless are entitled to sue for benefits they are
21. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
22. 24 Cal. 3d at 802, 598 P.2d at 62, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
23. Crawley interview, supra note 19.
24. Id.
25. My concern here is for the reduction of system overhead, a concern that cuts
across both tort and contract law.
denied because of a contractual breach.26 Lucas v. Hamm27 is the
leading authority for the proposition that a disappointed legatee is
entitled to secure a tort recovery from the lawyer guilty of negli-
gence in drafting a client's will. But Lucas contains an alternative
ruling to the effect that the legatee is an intended third-party benefi-
ciary of the lawyer-client contract, who accordingly is entitled to sue
the lawyer on account of the latter's contractual breach.28
In Lucas, tort and contract theories blend together, since due care
is the tort liability standard and since a promise of due care is what
a court reads into the lawyer-client contract in the absence of con-
trary language.29 The theories can be unblended, however, by consid-
ering two hypotheticals. In Hypothetical One, a lawyer explicitly
promises a client that he will draft a will that will achieve the cli-
ent's desired results; subsequently, for whatever reason, that promise
goes unfulfilled, notwithstanding an absence of negligence by the
lawyer. In such a case I am confident that a court both would and
should allow the would-be legatee to recover against the promise-
making lawyer. What my confidence obviously signifies is my under-
standing that contract rather than tort forms the essence of the lega-
tee's claim. Hypothetical Two involves a client from Los Angeles
who, in his will, wants to sponsor an annual conference to be held
(for the sake of prestige) at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel. Because of
negligent note-taking by the lawyer, the will instead ends up specify-
ing the (equally prestigious) Beverly Hills Hotel. For contract pur-
poses, the Beverly Wilshire is only an "incidental" beneficiary of the
client-lawyer agreement.30 Accordingly, I would confidently predict
that the hotel would be denied a tort recovery against the lawyer,
notwithstanding its status as highly foreseeable victim of the law-
yer's negligence.3 1 My confidence is supported by recent rulings in
California 32 and Maryland,3 3 which emphasize the requirement that
even a clearly foreseeable malpractice plaintiff be able to show that
he was an intended beneficiary of the lawyer-client contract.
In J'Aire the tenant had originally pleaded a contract third-party-
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
27. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1961).
28. Id. at 589-91, 364 P.2d at 688-89, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25.
29. Id. at 591, 364 P.2d at 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(2) & illustration 17
(1981).
31. Professor Rabin might well approve of the recovery by the hotel, since he
seems to regard the intent-to-benefit concept as no more than one factor among many
bearing on the ultimate issue of the foreseeability of harm. Rabin, supra note 1. For the
contract logic behind my prediction, see note 60 and accompanying text.
32. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 344, 556 P.2d 737, 743, 134 Cal. Rptr.
375, 381 (1976).
33. Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 115, 492 A.2d 618 (1985).
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beneficiary claim as well as a negligence claim against the contrac-
tor.3 4 However, after the trial court dismissed the entire suit, the
tenant chose to appeal its negligence claim alone.3 5 Why was the
tenant's contract argument dropped? The explanation provided me
by the tenant's lawyer is that he regarded the contract claim as a
probable loser; the lawyer went on to volunteer, however, that "con-
tracts were never my strong point in law school." 36 In my view, the
lawyer's abandonment of his contract argument was unfortunate.
Given the way in which the contractor's breach required the owner
to violate his own continuing legal obligations to the tenant, the ten-
ant may possibly have been classified as an "intended beneficiary" or
even a "creditor beneficiary" of the contract between the owner and
the contractor.3 7 To be sure, the Second Restatement of Contracts
contains both general language38 and a particular illustration39 that
seem unsympathetic to the tenant's third-party-beneficiary argu-
ment. But even if affirming a contract claim in J'Aire would have
required a change in the law, it is hardly clear that this change
would have been less momentous than the change effected by the
actual J'Aire holding, given the generalized significance it attaches
to the fact of a defendant's negligence. A ruling by the Idaho Su-
preme Court is in line with my evaluation. In appraising somewhat
J'Aire-like facts, that court refused to recognize a negligence cause
of action, yet permitted a tenant to sue a contractor under an ex-
panded intended beneficiary theory.40
The contract analysis relating to J'Aire can be clarified by amend-
34. 24 Cal. 3d at 801-03, 598 P.2d at 62, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
35. Id. at 803, 598 P.2d at 62, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
36. See Crawley interview, supra note 19.
37. Third-party creditor beneficiaries are, under the Restatement, a special cate-
gory of intended beneficiaries. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1)(a)
(1981).
38. The Restatement requires that the debtor be under an obligation to "pay
money" to the creditor's beneficiary. Id.
39. See id. at illustration 19.
40. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978). In
Just's, the defendant construction company entered into a contract with a city to reno-
vate a downtown business area. The delay of the defendant resulted in losses for the
plaintiff, a retail business that leased premises within the business area. The change in
facts from J'Aire to Just's both weakens and strengthens the intended beneficiary claim
of the tenant. On the one hand, only in J'Aire did the delay of the construction company
result in a breach of an actual contract running between the tenant and the entity em-
ploying the contractor. On the other hand, the construction project in Just's was financed
by a special assessment on properties within the area; also, the construction contract
included a clause expressing an intent to minimize the disruption of downtown business
operations.
ing the facts in that case so as to generate Hypothetical Three. The
original agreement between the owner and the contractor contains a
fixed completion date and the tenant is protected by a lease for a
term; events then unfold that result in the contractor's failure to
comply, even though there is an absence of negligence on the part of
the contractor. My own assessment of this hypothetical is that de-
spite the lack of negligence, the tenant should be entitled to recover
from the contractor for the latter's contractual breach. As far as the
owner is concerned, what it loses by way of a higher ex ante contract
payment it regains by way of its relief from its own liability under its
lease.41 Moreover, since a chief advantage of a direct suit by the
tenant is that it would simplify litigation by avoiding a cumbersome
chain reaction, there is little reason for complicating that direct suit
by bringing in the always contentious issue of negligence. And since
that chain reaction would guarantee the tenant's recovery, no pur-
pose is served by conditioning the tenant's recovery on the tenant's
ability to establish the contractor's negligence. Indeed, in J'Aire it-
self, the tenant won the tort theoretician's war but lost the crucial
battle: At the trial on remand after the supreme court's decision, the
tenant was unable to establish that the contractor had proceeded un-
reasonably, and hence went home without a penny."2
Now consider, however, Hypothetical Four, in which the contrac-
tor, without negligence, is unable to complete the renovations by the
date fixed in the agreement with the owner, and in which the rela-
tionship between the owner and the tenant is a tenancy-at-will rather
than a tenancy for a fixed term. Moreover, the owner in all its deal-
ings with the tenant and the contractor has emphasized the at-will
quality of the tenancy; still, the owner's past renewal of this tenancy
makes it highly likely that the owner would have extended it further
in the absence of the contractor's breach. In such a case, the com-
mon law is clear that the tenant cannot recover: for the lack of negli-
gence precludes any tort claim, while contract law would readily
classify the tenant as a mere incidental beneficiary. 43 Yet even
though the result of. no liability is doctrinally uncontroversial, the
tenant does incur a clear reduction in welfare because of the contrac-
tor's breach. Hence the justification for the firm common law result
should at least be considered. In negotiating the agreement, the con-
tractor and the owner can be expected to appreciate that circum-
stances might intervene that would prevent the contractor from
meeting the completion date. The contract price will thus include a
41. This point responds to the concern voiced infra at the text accompanying note
53.
42. See Crawley interview, supra note 19.
43. See McDonald Const. Co. v. Murray, 5 Wash. App. 68, 485 P.2d 626 (1971)
(prospective tenant not third-party beneficiary).
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mark-up to cover the prospect of the contractor's liability to the
owner. If a failure to complete would render the contractor liable to
the tenant-at-will as well, an additional mark-up will be required. If
the owner's demand for renovations is price inelastic, the owner will
bear, by way of that mark-up, the entire cost of the contractor's po-
tential liability to the tenant. If there is price elasticity between the
owner and the contractor, the cost of that potential liability will be
partly passed on to the owner and partly absorbed by the contractor.
Indeed, by driving a wedge between what the contractor supplies and
what the owner receives, that liability will prevent some owners and
contractors from reaching agreement on renovation projects.
Recognizing the claims of tenants-at-will would therefore burden
both owners and contractors. Conversely, that recognition would of
course benefit tenants. The easiest way to find out whether a particu-
lar tenant's benefits outweigh the owner's and the contractor's bur-
dens, while at the same time preserving everyone's freedom of
choice, is to rely on each party's expressions of value, as manifested
in private contracts." Since it is the owner in J'Aire who already
stands in a bargaining relationship with both the tenant and the con-
tractor, a market analysis, keen on reducing the complexity of nego-
tiations, can focus its attention on the owner.4 5 If protecting the ten-
ant is on balance advantageous, one would expect the owner and the
tenant to agree on a lease for a term rather than on a mere tenancy-
at-will. 46 Alternatively, one would expect them to agree, somewhat
more selectively, that the owner will explicitly identify the tenant as
an intended beneficiary in the owner's contract with the contractor.
Should the facts of an individual case reveal the absence of such a
lease or such an identification, then the common law probably
behaves properly if it ignores the tenant's interests.
In J'Aire, of course, the court's holding rests on the premise of the
contractor's negligence. But how does the claim of negligence con-
tribute to our understanding of the situation in J'Aire? I would be
among the first to agree-indeed, to assert-that the concept of neg-
44. In J'Aire there is no indication of any market blockages of the sort that would
render unattractive the market approach that the text here recommends. Both the tenant
and the contractor seem to be small businesses; the owner is a California county.
45. It would be too complex-too costly-to expect the tenant to open up negotia-
tions with the contractor in order to work out their own agreement.
46. So long as the contractor is given the advance notice of this lease that Hadley
requires, the contractor will then be responsible to the owner if the contractor's default
results in the owner's liability to the tenant. See supra text accompanying note 21.
ligence resonates deep in the structure of our intuitions.47 In the spe-
cific environment of J'Aire, however, the negligence notion seems
disconcertingly subordinate to the basic contract between the owner
and the contractor. Only that contract makes comprehensible the
contractor's physical intrusion into the owner's building; it alone sets
the goal towards which the contractor must non-negligently strive.
If, for example, the contract requires merely that all work be com-
pleted within three years, and if the contractor meets that deadline,
then the contractor cannot be charged with negligence, even if the
tenant has evidence tending to show that the contractor could easily
have made faster progress or could "reasonably" have completed the
project more rapidly. By a similar token, if the contract sets a three-
month deadline, the J'Aire court would turn to the contract in as-
serting the existence of the contractor's three-month tort "duty."
Not ordinary negligence but rather negligent breach of contract is
what J'Aire is all about.48
To be sure, the previous paragraph has assumed a typical con-
struction contract that fixes the date of completion. But note that in
J'Aire, as the lower court reported, "[t]he contract contained a pro-
vision that time was of the essence and for completion on a fixed
date . . . . However, the space for- insertion of the completion date
was left blank.' 49 Faced with this omission, the supreme court as-
sumed it could read into the contract an obligation that the work be
completed "within a reasonable time as defined by custom and us-
age." 50 How does this circumstance affect our analysis? To conclude
for contract purposes that the contractor must complete the project
within a "reasonable time" seems tantamount to asserting that the
contractor must pursue the project in a reasonable, non-negligent
way. On J'Aire's facts, therefore, the tenant's negligence claim
47. See Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability,
15 GA. L. REv. 963 (1981).
48. To suggest that contract is a central problem in J'Aire is by no means to
endorse a "privity" limitation in tort law generally. If, for example, a manufacturer in-
troduces into this world a dangerous product, the negligence of the manufacturer can be
evaluated, in most cases, without worrying about the preferences of the manufacturer's
original buyer. Another example: assume that A agrees with B that B, driving A's car,
will deliver for A a package to a distant location; assume further that B, in performing
this contract, drives A's car at a negligent speed, damaging the car but also wounding C,
a pedestrian. Undeniably, C can sue B in tort; the contract is in no way needed in order
to evaluate the tortiousness of B's conduct. If anything, that contract might expand tort
liabilities: if A and B had agreed (for the sake of rapid delivery) that B would drive quite
fast, then the contract would convert B's speeding into a joint venture for which A is
liable as well as B.
49. 150 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330 n.1, vacated, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 407 (1979). Before depublication, the appellate court case was reported at 86 Cal.
App. 3d 492. See CAL. R. CT. 976-978 (rules for publication of appellate decisions).
50. J'Aire, 24 Cal. 3d at 802, 598 P.2d at 62, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 409. Construction
contracts are frequently silent as to the completion date; a judicially declared or statuto-
rily created "reasonable time" obligation is hence common.
46
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against the contractor is almost identical to the tenant's contract
third-party-beneficiary claim.
The entire problem of third-party-beneficiary can be highlighted
by considering Hypothetical Five, which is presented here in a highly
abstract form. A makes a promise to B, the performance of which
will foreseeably provide benefits to both B and C. Intervening cir-
cumstances then make the promise expensive for A fully to perform.
Given those circumstances, the cost of compliance is now $10,000;
the benefit that B will derive from full performance is $8000, while
the benefit to C is $4000. Contract law is generally interpreted as
permitting and indeed encouraging a party to commit an "efficient
breach.'51 Yet whether a breach by A is "efficient" on these facts
depends precisely on whether C's interest should be regarded as ma-
terial. A first impression, which relies on obvious tort-like ethical and
economic notions, is that the welfare of all persons should be of con-
cern to the law. But, as the previous discussion of Hypothetical Four
suggests, one must recognize that affirming the rights of C will im-
pose a burden on the contractual opportunities between A and B.52 It
is B who evidently has established a relationship with C. The real
question, therefore, is whether that relationship is of such a charac-
ter that B should be understood as willing to finance the potential
liability of A to C. And this is essentially the question that the ex-
isting law of intended third-party beneficiary can be viewed as ad-
dressing and attempting to answer.5 3
Given this background, we can now return to J'Aire. Notice, first
of all, a possible ambiguity in the J'Aire negligence concept. Con-
sider Hypothetical Six, which is merely an expansion of J'Aire. The
contractor realizes that he can complete the project by a particular
date at a cost of $10,000; should the project not be completed by
that date, the owner will suffer losses of $8000 while the losses of the
tenant will be $4000. 51 Moreover, a feature in the lease arrangement
prevents the tenant from transferring its losses to the owner.
51. See Pearlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies:
A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI L. REv. 61, 79-82 (1982).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
53. See W. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 722 (1982). Note that the extent to which
the cost of liability is passed backward from A to B depends on the extent of the elastic-
ity in the demand and supply curves which are involved in the contract between A and B.
Only if B's demand for A's services is completely inelastic will the entire cost of A's
potential liability get passed on by A to B. The more elastic B's demand, the greater the
extent to which that liability will remain with A.
54. What the owner loses is rental income; what the tenant suffers is a loss of its
consumer surplus under the lease.
Whether the contractor would here be negligent for a failure to com-
plete would evidently depend on whether the contractor is obligated
to take the tenant's interests significantly into account in calculating
his own behavior. And this, of course, essentially restates the third-
party-beneficiary problem. The effort to conceptualize the case in
terms of tort rather than contract may therefore result in failure. In
order to decide the tort issue, the court may need to decide the basic
contract issue as well.
Now subject the facts in J'Aire to another shift, leading to Hypo-
thetical Seven. The contractor has agreed to complete the renova-
tions by a certain date. Nevertheless, the contractor defaults on his
promise in circumstances manifesting the negligence of the contrac-
tor. However, the relationship between the tenant and the owner is a
mere tenancy-at-will, of the emphatic sort described in Hypothetical
Four.5 5 As in Hypothetical Four, the tenant hardly classifies as an
intended beneficiary,56 and therefore lacks any contract claim. Yet if
the facts support a prediction that the owner would have extended
the tenancy in the absence of the contractor's negligent breach, the
general holding in J'Aire can be read as supporting the recovery of
the tenant.
Perhaps, however, that holding should be more narrowly inter-
preted. In explaining the precedent of the malpractice cases, the
court relied on the legatees' status as "intended beneficiaries '57 of
the lawyer-client contracts; in evaluating the J'Aire facts, the court
emphasized that the contractor-owner agreement was "intended to
. . . affect" the tenant.58 Both the precedent of intended benefit and
the finding of intended effect would be considerably weakened if the
plaintiff were merely a tenant-at-will. Moreover, the final paragraph
of the J'Aire opinion insists that its new tort does not extend to situ-
ations of "ordinary business risk;' 59 the disadvantage suffered by a
mere tenant-at-will might well be placed within this classification.
The J'Aire rule thus might decline to provide protection to the ten-
ant-at-will. But if so, then that rule, though largely explained by the
court in pure tort terms, would turn out to include important con-
tractual components.
My view is, moreover, that denying a tort recovery to the tenant-
at-will is probably the right result. Subjecting the contractor to tort
liability to that tenant would impose significant costs on the contrac-
tual opportunities of the owner and the contractor; and if the owner
does not recognize the tenant as an intended beneficiary of its agree-
55. See supra text accompanying note 43.
56. See supra note 43.
57. 24 Cal. 3d at 804, 598 P.2d at 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 808, 598 P.2d at 65, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
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ment with the contractor, the infliction of these costs seems unintelli-
gent, as my discussions of Hypotheticals Four and Five indicate.60
Possibly, however, my analysis thus far has been too severe, inso-
far as it has tended to treat tort and contract as dichotomous-as
wholly alternative modes of analyses. One can imagine, instead, a
methodology under which one begins by separately identifying "tort
ideas" and "contract ideas" and then proceeds to ponder various
ways in which these ideas might interact or intersect.6" Yet I refer
here to the possibility of a tort-contract coalition without any clear
idea as to its actual structure. Still, my recommendation is hardly
without precedent. After all, there are familiar personal injury situa-
tions-mainly involving affirmative duties-in which a certain com-
bination of contract and tort is already required before a plaintiff is
entitled to sue. Consider, via Hypothetical Eight, an auto mechanic,
hired to fix the clutch of a car, who realizes that the brakes are also
in a dangerous condition and clearly need repair. Even so, only if the
60. If my notion is that the contractor's potential liability to the tenant-at-will
imposes burdens on the contractor and the owner, this notion deserves some amplifica-
tion. The contractor's agreement with the owner obliges the contractor to act "reasona-
bly;" the contractor can be expected to comply with this obligation, since it is less costly
to do so than to incur liability to the owner; and by thus avoiding unreasonableness/
negligence, the contractor effectively discharges his obligation to the tenant. It can be
argued, therefore, that this latter obligation, as an independent matter, is essentially cost-
free.
This argument, however, would be flawed. First of all, if J'Aire's negligence doctrine
signifies that the contractor must now balance his own interests against the interests of
the owner and the tenant in combination, then that doctrine requires of the contractor a
more expensive effort than would be mandated by the contractor's reasonableness obliga-
tion that runs to the owner alone. In addition, the unreasonable conduct that is actiona-
ble in an individual case may well be due to the contractor's employee; since the contrac-
tor is liable for such negligence only because of the strict liability doctrine of respondeat
superior, it cannot be said that this negligence will be necessarily prevented by the incen-
tive effects of the contractor's liability to the owner. Moreover, so long as there is a
foreseeable risk of judicial error in the identification of negligence, to recognize the ten-
ant's negligence law rights would subject even the non-negligent contractor to an extra
measure of liability exposure. Finally (and notwithstanding the economists' models), in
many instances the negligence of the contractor may consist of goof-ups and inadvertent
errors that the contractor, in a psychologically realistic sense, is unable to prevent. See
Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697,
713-19 (1978). Once again, then, to affirm the claim of the tenant serves to expand the
potential liability of the contractor.
Similarly, the lawyer's mistranscription in Hypothetical Two is in one sense a stupid
mistake; yet in another sense it is the kind of mistake that will predictably happen in
some instances. Hence, the lawyer's liability exposure in Hypothetical Two cannot really
be eliminated by the lawyer's sincere willingness to exercise care.
61. See the discussion of a "general theory" of civil liability in Cane, Contract,
Tort, and Professional Negligence, in TORT LAW AND ECONoMIc Loss (M. Furmston
ed. 1986).
mechanic has contractual authority from the owner to work on the
brakes can he be held liable to anyone, either the owner or a third
party, for failing to do so. 62 Consider next, in H ,pothetical Nine, the
mechanic who not only receives this authority but who provides the
car owner with a flat-out promise that the brakes will perform safely
during the succeeding month. Two weeks later, despite the absence
of any negligence by the mechanic, the brakes manage to fail. If a
collision results involving the car owner and a third-party pedestrian,
the mechanic evidently would be liable to the former but not to the
latter.6 3 In order to secure a recovery from the mechanic, the pedes-
trian must demonstrate both a contractual undertaking and the
mechanic's negligent performance.
But even this final pro-liability result should be carefully inter-
preted, since I remain opposed to the negligence claim of the Beverly
Wilshire Hotel in Hypothetical Two and doubtful about the claim of
the tenant-at-will in the J'Aire variation in Hypothetical Seven. The
distinguishing feature is basically this: The law of torts imposes upon
the owner of a car a firm and proper common-law obligation to avoid
causing negligent injury to a pedestrian; yet the owner of the build-
ing neither is nor should be obliged by the common law to continue
to provide the benefits of housing to a tenant-at-will. Given this dis-
tinction, it makes strong sense to impose on the car owner, through
his contract with the mechanic, a portion of the ex ante cost of the
mechanic's potential liability to the pedestrian in the event of the
mechanic's negligence, even while sparing the building owner of the
cost of any liability that might run from the contractor to the tenant-
at-will.
In any event, whether or not I have reached the proper conclu-
sions, I am confident that my collection of hypotheticals is on the
right track, in the sense of raising the right issues for present and
future discussion. They likewise encourage a particular two-part ap-
praisal of the J'Aire opinion. First, the J'Aire facts provided the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court with a splendid opportunity to investigate the
relationships between tort and contract in an economic loss setting.
Second, this was an opportunity that the court chose largely to
squander.
Fourteen years earlier, the same court had been presented with a
quite separate problem relating to the common law treatment of eco-
nomic loss. What that problem was, and how the court responded to
it, will be described below, after a brief introduction.
62. The mechanic may, however, be under an implied obligation to notify the car
owner of the brake problem.
63. For an early holding that contractual liability of a repairman does not run to
a third party, see Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547, 255 P. 939 (1927).
There is no indication in this case that the plaintiff advanced any claim of negligence.
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY: COMMON LAW AND STATUTE
The dimensions of the modern products liability doctrine can
briefly be sketched.64 First, a products liability claim depends on the
plaintiff's proof of a "defect" in the product. Second, the plaintiff
can include the ultimate product consumer, other actual product
users (such as employees), and even bystanders, as long as the plain-
tiff is a foreseeable victim of the defective product. Third, the pri-
mary defendant is the product manufacturer, but there are other
permissible defendants, including the retailer of the defective prod-
uct. Fourth, at least according to the Second Restatement of Torts,
products liability rights cannot be disclaimed. 65
Finally, in the typical products liability action, the harm com-
plained of is a personal injury. What if, however, the defective prod-
uct results in damage to property owned by the plain-
tiff-particularly damage to property other than the defective
product itself? It was Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court who (in a 1944 concurrence) first recommended the strict lia-
bility theory"6 and who then (in a 1963 opinion for the full court)
was able to give effect to his own recommendation. 7 In 1965, in
Seely v. White Motor Company,68 Justice Traynor, speaking for the
California court, ruled that damage to property comes within the
protection of the products liability doctrine.6 9 Notice in this regard
the form of Traynor's argument. His position might have been that
protecting against property damage is a strong and basic tort law
tradition. Consider, for example, Rylands v. Fletcher,7" the problem
64. See, e.g., Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive
Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz, New Products];
Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435 (1979).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965).
66. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
67. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
68. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24 (1965).
69. This is a conclusion that other courts have generally followed. See, e.g., New-
man v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 648 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1981); Grey v. Bradford-White
Corp., 581 F. Supp. 725, 728 (D. Kan. 1984); County of Johnson v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284, 292 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); Beauchamp v. Yazoo Valley Oil &
Milling Co., 403 So. 2d 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Superwood Corp. v.
Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981). Note that in several of these
cases the defective product at no point posed any threat of personal injury. For one prop-
erty damage case denying recovery under products liability because of the lack of such a
threat, see Brown v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 268 Or. 470, 521 P.2d 537 (1974).
70. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
of trespassing cattle,7 and the American blasting cases;7 12 notice,
moreover, that even before the 1960's, manufacturers had frequently
been held liable under the negligence doctrine when their defective
products resulted in damage to property. 73 Perhaps unwisely, Tray-
nor declined to emphasize this point about tradition. Instead, his po-
sition was that "[p]hysical injury to property is so akin to personal
injury that there is no reason for distinguishing them. 17 4 It was thus
the physical similarity of property damage and personal injury, and
also perhaps of the events leading up to them, that led Traynor to
the view that it would be improperly arbitrary to withhold a prod-
ucts liability recovery.
What, however, should the products liability result be if the defect
in the product occasions merely economic loss: either "direct" loss
(such as the costs of repair or replacement) or "consequential" loss
(such as the denial of profits while the product is not functioning
properly)? In Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.,75 the New
Jersey Supreme Court, also a pioneer in the development of modern
doctrine, had ruled that products liability extends even to economic
losses, at least of the direct type. In Justice Traynor's view, however,
Santor went too far; accordingly, in the course of his Seely opinion
Traynor announced his conclusion that economic loss was beyond the
reach of the products liability doctrine.78
In the twenty years between Seely and early 1985, the vast major-
ity of courts that confronted the choice between Santor and Seely
proceeded to embrace Seely.7 7 A limited number of jurisdictions, in-
cluding Michigan 7  and Wisconsin,7 adopted Santor, and in doing
so applied Santor to a considerable range of product purchasers8"
and to economic losses both direct and consequential. 81 Recently,
federal courts have addressed the Santor-Seely issue in the context
of federal admiralty law: in their rulings these courts have divided
71. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 5, at 539-41.
72. See id. at 553-54.
73. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 501-02 (2d ed. 1955).
74. Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
75. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
76. 63 Cal. 2d at 15-19, 403 P.2d at 149-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-24.
77. The cases are collected in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 287 n.13 (3d Cir. 1980).
78. Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970).
79. City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroder & Assocs., Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240
N.W.2d 124 (1976). See also lacano v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 71
Ohio Op. 2d 66, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
80. The plaintiff in Cova was a commercial buyer. See supra note 78 and accom-
panying text.
81. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) (Santor applied to consequential losses).
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between Santor 2 and Seely.8 3 At the end of 1985, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in one of these admiralty cases,8
4
evidently in order to resolve the inter-circuit conflict.
Several months prior to this grant of certiorari, however, the New
Jersey Supreme Court had reconsidered its own position. In Spring
Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., that court, acknowl-
edging the generally negative response to Santor, ruled that a "com-
mercial buyer" should not be allowed to sue in products liability for
its economic losses.85 Left open by Spring Motors is the question
whether a non-commercial ordinary consumer remains able to bring
such a claim.86 Of course, the New Jersey Spring Motors decision in
no way requires a state such as Michigan to withdraw from its own
pro-Santor position, nor does Spring Motors bar other courts (in-
cluding the United States Supreme Court) which have not yet taken
any position from opting for the doctrine that Santor has historically
represented. Accordingly, what is here referred to as the "Santor-
Seely debate" clearly survives Spring Motors' partial rejection of
Santor.
Still, the popularity of the Seely rule requires that emphasis be
placed on the distinction between damaged property and mere eco-
nomic loss that is asserted in Seely and accepted in Spring Motors.7
That distinction can be easily illustrated. If a defective television set
catches fire and burns down the plaintiff's house, the damage to the
house is fully compensable in products liability. If, however, the ex-
82. See Emerson G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan Enterprise, 732 F.2d 1468 (9th
Cir. 1984) (rejecting Seely and allowing recovery even for consequential losses).
83. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 752 F.2d 903 (3d
Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 56 (1985).
84. Id. The Supreme Court might decide East River by relying on the idea that
the admiralty plaintiff is a unique federal-court favorite. See Emerson G.M. Diesel, 732
F.2d at 1472. If the Court does this, then the Court's opinion might not fully consider
the Seely issue. East River also presents difficult questions of federal admiralty jurisdic-
tion. The Court heard oral arguments on January 21, 1986.
85. 98 N.J. 555, 561, 489 A.2d 660, 663 (1985). As Spring Motors pointed out
in somewhat distinguishing Santor, Santor on its facts involved an ordinary consumer.
Id. at 575, 489 A.2d at 670. Yet the Santor holding was written broadly, applying to all
"ultimate purchasers;" and the opinion approved a prior case in which the plaintiff had
been a commercial buyer. See 44 N.J. at 66, 67, 207 A.2d 305, 309 (citing Randy Knit-
wear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1962)).
86. One federal court, in dictum, has already interpreted Spring Motors as pre-
serving the Santor rights of the ordinary consumer. Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Products
Co., 766 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 1985).
87. Spring Motors agrees that the commercial buyer who suffers property dam-
age can bring a products liability suit. 98 N.J. at 578, 489 A.2d at 672.
pensive television set merely goes "poof" and thereafter projects no
picture, the loss of the owner is only economic and hence is beyond
the reach of products liability a8
To assert, however, that the owner is unprotected by products lia-
bility need not imply that the owner is deprived of all rights. Quite
to the contrary, the owner's opportunity to recover is clearly and sig-
nificantly recognized by the sales law doctrine of implied warranty.
The idea of implied warranty has deep roots in both American and
English law.89 At times, implied warranty has been defended in tort-
like terms of public policy. As a South Carolina court stated in 1793,
"in every contract all imaginable fairness ought to be observed
... . Selling for a sound price, raises, in laws, a warranty of the
goodness of the thing sold . . . . This warranty extends to all faults,
known and unknown to the seller." 90 On other occasions, the doc-
trine of implied warranty has been defended by resort to contractual
logic, as an explication of an implied provision in the parties' agree-
ment: as an English court stated in 1877, a product "must answer
the description of it which is contained in words in the contract, or
which would be so contained if the contract were accurately drawn
out."9'
The doctrine of implied warranty presently can be found in the
Uniform Commercial Code.92 Conceived of in the 1940's, drafted
mainly in the 1950's, and adopted in the 1960's by almost every
88. In particular cases the distinction between economic loss and damage to the
"other" property of the plaintiff can become exceedingly elusive. Consider the situation,
for example, in which the supplier provides a manufacturer with a defective component
part; after the entire assembled product is sold to the consumer, the defective component
malfunctions in a way that results in damage to the remainder of the product. If the
plaintiff brings suit exclusively against the supplier, is he allowed to argue that the final
product is his "other" property that has been damaged by the defendant's defective com-
ponent? Or is that defective component necessarily no more than an aspect of a unified
product, even though that component has been manufactured by a separate entity? See
James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166, 174 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983).
For a further indication of the difficulties involved in line-drawing, one can consult
Two Rivers Company v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1980), in which
bull semen, sold by the defendant to a rancher for the purpose of artificially inseminating
the rancher's cattle, turned out to contain impurities, thereby producing defects in the
calves who were the offspring of the artificial insemination process. If the calves are
regarded as property separate from the original semen, then the rancher can secure a
products liability recovery under the first half of the Seely compromise. If, however, the
calves are best understood as basically a "continuation" of the original bull-semen prod-
ucts, the Seely rule of non-recovery for economic loss is called into play.
89. For one account of the Anglo-American history of implied warranty, see
Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American Products
Liability, 27 CASE W. REs. 647, 654-59 (1977).
90. Timrod v. Shoolbred, 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 324 (S.C. 1793). Implied warranty
was, however, a minority position in the United States during the nineteenth century.
See, e.g., McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55 (Pa. 1839) (rejecting the doctrine).
91. Randall v. Newson, 2 Q.B.D. 102, 109 (C.A. 1877).
92. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977).
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American state legislature, the UCC's objective is "to simplify, clar-
ify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions. 9 3
The UCC is not one of those statutes, like workers' compensation or
the Wagner Act, whose goal is to establish a wholly new regime;
indeed, most of the UCC's major ideas, including implied warranty,
are drawn from common law sources.94 When matched against the
common law doctrine of products liability, however, there are certain
limitations in the implied warranty doctrine as ramified by the UCC.
It is precisely when, for one reason or another, the UCC declines to
affirm the plaintiff's claim that the status of that claim under prod-
ucts liability law becomes a meaningful question. Since this is the
case, two points stand out. One is that both Santor and Seely turn
out, on their facts, to be largely meaningless, since in each case the
court was able to affirm that the disappointed product owner could
secure a full recovery under regular warranty principles.9 5
A second point is that any evaluation of the Seely rule requires a
comparison of the common law doctrine of products liability and the
implied warranty doctrine of the UCC. According to many observ-
ers, this comparison should be undertaken at a high level of abstrac-
tion: for frequently it is stated, as in Spring Motors, that products
liability is the essence of tort while implied warranty lies at the heart
of contract.96 Under this assumption, the Santor-Seely debate97 con-
cerns whether tort or contract principles are the best solution to the
economic loss problem. True enough, it is common usage to describe
93. Id. § 1-102(2).
94. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2d ed. 1980).
95. Seely invoked the doctrine of express warranty. 63 Cal. 2d at 13, 403 P.2d at
148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20. Santor relied on implied warranty. The Santor opinion tended
to discuss implied warranty in the abstract, although finally acknowledging the Uniform
Sales Act, which was in effect at the time of the Santor retail sale. 44 N.J. at 68, 207
A.2d at 313. In fact, by the time that Santor was decided, the New Jersey legislature
had adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 568, 489
A.2d at 666. But since the UCC did not apply retroactively, it was not directly at issue in
Santor. Still, it is notable that the Santor opinion did not even mention the UCC.
Clearly, the court did not appreciate that the adoption of the UCC might limit the sig-
nificance of its holding.
96. See 98 N.J. at 571, 578, 489 A.2d at 666, 672; Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Na-
tional Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 81-82, 435 N.E.2d 443, 448 (1982). See also Note, Eco-
nomic Losses and Strict Product Liability: A Record of Judicial Confusion Between
Contract and Tort, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118 (1978).
97. Since the UCC was not in issue in Santor, see supra note 95, there is an
analytic awkwardness in treating Santor as the leading case; Spring Motors of course
adds to the awkwardness. But my text employs Santor in the way that the case is gener-
ally (if imperfectly) understood within the American legal community. At this stage of
the debate, it would not be helpful to replace "Santor rule" language with "Cova rule"
language. See supra note 78.
products liability as a branch of "tort." Nevertheless, the equation of
products liability with tort and of implied warranty with contract
may well be misleading. Many contract ideas can be identified
within products liability doctrine: for example, the frequent emphasis
on "ordinary consumer expectations" as a test of liability.9" More-
over, the very notion of an automatic implied warranty in every sales
transaction may rest, as previously noted,99 on a tort conception of
obligation. In any event, the extent to which it is correct to insist on
a tort/contract characterization of the debate about Seely can be
considered more fully below, as attention is given to the actual dif-
ferences between products liability and implied warranty in the eco-
nomic loss setting.
At least at first, no great difference is apparent in the basic stan-
dard of liability. While products liability is "strict," so is implied
warranty, as the 1793 South Carolina opinion excerpted above
makes clear. 100 In products liability a plaintiff needs to show a prod-
uct "defect," while in implied warranty the consumer must show
that the product was "unmerchantable;"'' l and these terms seem for
most purposes to be synonymous or interchangable. 10 If, for exam-
ple, the offending product contains a "manufacturing defect"-an
assembly-line flaw that differentiates it from the normal product of
the manufacturer-then the product can easily be classified as "un-
merchantable," given its failure to conform to the "fair average
quality set by manufacturer."103
As far as product design is concerned, implied warranty is satis-
fied so long as the product is "fit for ordinary purposes." 0 4 This
seems equivalent to one of the design tests under products liability:
that the product comply with ordinary consumer expectations. 05
Products liability also allows the plaintiff to rely on a risk-benefit
analysis in an effort to prove that the product could have been better
designed. 0 6 Everyone will agree that the price of a product should
be a strong factor in assessing the adequacy of its design in any
claim for economic loss. But under each of the standards described
98. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-27, 573 P.2d 443,
452, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 234 (1978).
99. See supra text accompanying note 90.
100. See id.
101. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1977).
102. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 94, at 353. One problem with the
Seely opinion is that Justice Traynor seemed to believe that the truck in controversy was
rendered unsatisfactory only because of the buyer's idiosyncratic needs. 63 Cal. 2d at 16-
17, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23. If this was so, then a products liability
claim, even if allowed, would have failed because of the lack of any demonstrable defect.
103. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(b) (1977).
104. Id. § 2-314(2)(c).
105. See supra text accompanying note 98.
106. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 427, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
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above, price can be taken quite significantly into account. As for the
UCC, one of its official comments states that "in cases of doubt as to
what quality is intended, the price [of the product] is an excellent
index of the nature and scope of [the seller's] obligation." 107 As far
as products liability doctrine is concerned, a low price would reduce
the consumer's expectations, and would also provide a benefit to the
consumer that would tend to justify the product's less impressive
performance.
As indicated, implied warranty is concerned with the "ordinary
purposes" of the product, and is evidently satisfied if the product is
basically of average quality.108 Notably, products liability doctrine
can become more ambitious, extending to "foreseeable misuses" of
the product 09 and allowing the plaintiff to complain about the de-
sign of the product, even if that design conforms to industry cus-
tom.110 This is, at least, the practice that products liability adopts in
personal injury cases. If, however, courts were to extend products
liability to problems of economic loss, one can predict that they
would endorse a more warranty-like conception of what counts as a
defective design. This prediction stems not so much from any dispar-
agement of economic loss as from a concern for the manageability of
litigation. In a personal injury case, a court can concentrate on the
particular design feature that caused the plaintiff's injury. There
may be, however, a huge number of design features that cause a
product to be less valuable (rather than more valuable) to its owner;
and courts will and should be wary of accepting the responsibility for
reviewing, in any given case, whichever design elements an owner
chooses to complain about.1 1
In any event, even if the the warranty and products liability ap-
proaches may potentially diverge, this potential has not been realized
in the case law. To better ascertain what the real-world differences
107. U.C.C. § 2-314 official comment 7 (1977). Note that price is an "excellent"
rather than an "absolute" index, and serves as an index only in otherwise doubtful cases.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
109. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972).
110. In California, proof of compliance with custom is not even admissible on be-
half of the manufacturer in a products liability action. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
Ill. When economic loss is brought about, however, by a clearly defined break-
down of the product, this concern is held to a minimum. Observe that, 20 years after
adoption of the UCC, its concept of unmerchantability still is waiting for authoritative
judicial clarification: the lawyer continues to encounter the "challenging job" of explain-
ing the concept to judge and jury. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 94, at 356.
may be between products liability and warranty, I have read through
something like 100 cases in which the plaintiff, having suffered an
economic loss, has attempted to invoke the products liability doc-
trine; in studying each case, I have attempted to figure out what
feature of implied warranty law rendered that cause of action un-
available or unattractive. 112 My research did not locate a single case
in which the plaintiff was prevented from resorting to implied war-
ranty because of its "average" quality and "ordinary purposes"
limitations. 113
One official limitation on the implied warranty right that fre-
quently has been alluded to in the literature concerning the economic
loss problem is the UCC's requirement that the plaintiff provide the
defendant with notice of an impending claim within a "reasonable
time" after the plaintiff detects the warranty violation. 14 No such
notice requirement is imposed on a products liability claim. 1 5 Here,
however, there is much less than meets the eye: for the notice re-
quirement is a paper tiger. My study found no case in which the
plaintiff's products liability claim for economic loss is explainable by
the plaintiff's failure to give notice under the UCC; 116 furthermore,
the commentators agree that the UCC requirement is porous and
flexible. 1 7 Indeed, a UCC Official Comment makes clear that the
requirement should be applied forgivingly to the situation of the or-
dinary consumer at retail: "the rule of requiring notification is
designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith
112. My methodology is, of course, inadequate in one inevitable way: it gives me
no data on how many economic loss claimants are basically satisfied with their implied
warranty rights. Another inadequacy is that in many cases the explanation for the un-
availability of implied warranty is not made clear.
113. A "no importance" finding likewise pertains to whatever possible differences
there might be between the measure of damages in implied warranty, as compared to
products liability. In a UCC warranty action, consequential damages can be recovered
under a liberal version of the Hadley v. Baxendale rule. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 94, at 389-91. Conceivably the eggshell-skull test of tort law might be even
more generous to plaintiffs who seek to recover for consequential damages. But the case
law simply fails to bear this out: I found no case in which access to the eggshell-skull rule
explains why the plaintiff was attempting to sue in products liability rather than in
warranty.
114. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1977).
115. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61-62, 377 P.2d
897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
116. Santor arose under the Uniform Sales Act. The Santor consumer notified the
dealer promptly, but was frustrated in his efforts to even identify the manufacturer. 44
N.J. at 56, 207 A.2d at 307. In such a situation, it is extremely unlikely that the notice
provisions of the UCC would be interpreted so as to defeat the consumer's suit against
the manufacturer.
117. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 94, at 421-26; Note, Strict
Liability and Warranty in Consumer Protection: The Broader Protection of the UCC in
Cases Involving Economic Loss, Used Goods, and Nondangerous Defective Goods, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347, 1366-68 (1982).
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consumer of his remedy."' 18
"Privity" is an issue that has frequently confounded or compli-
cated the law of implied warranty, and the abandonment of privity
limitations generally is regarded as one of the chief attributes of the
products liability doctrine. Problems of so-called "horizontal" privity
will be considered first. The general assumption is that the plaintiff
bringing an implied warranty claim is the actual product owner;119
products liability, by contrast, confers its rights on all foreseeable
victims, including the bystander. However, brief reflection confirms
that, at least in core cases of economic loss, the UCC limitation is
really not very limiting. Given the very nature of economic loss, the
party suffering such loss on account of a defective product will typi-
cally be the product owner. In general, only the owner is in a posi-
tion to be burdened by the costs of repair and replacement, and it is
the owner who is most likely to suffer some immediate loss of profits
on account of a poorly functioning product.1 20
Besides horizontal privity, there is the problem of so-called "verti-
cal" privity. Under products liability, the ultimate consumer can of
course sue the retailer; but given the abandonment of any vertical
privity limitation, she is free to sue the manufacturer as well, and
usually chooses to do so. The UCC in turn identifies the retailer
(more precisely, the immediate product seller) as the primary defen-
dant in an implied warranty action.1 21 It is not the case, however,
that the UCC rules out an implied warranty action against the re-
118. U.C.C. § 2-607 official comment 4 (1977).
119. See id. § 2-301.
120. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,- 626 F.2d
280, 288 (3d Cir. 1980); Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40
TENN. L. REV. 309, 316-17 (1973).
To be sure, there may be cases in which the owner has leased the product to another,
so that the lessee is the party who incurs both repair costs and profit interruptions. But
the lessee problem is one that the UCC simply does not address; whether the lessee is
entitled to bring a warranty action is an open question, and one for the courts to decide.
Even in these cases, therefore, products liability and implied warranty do not necessarily
lead to divergent results.
In a few cases, the party suffering economic loss may be tantamount to a bystander.
For example, if the turnover of a defective truck results in blockage of a bridge for
several hours, the delays in transportation could induce economic losses among a number
of entities who are other than product owners or users. Assume, however, that no tort
recoveries would be allowed against the truck driver where negligent operation of the
truck brings about a turnover. If so, then the fact that the blockage is occasioned by a
defective product should not alter the no liability result. See Dundee Cement Co. v.
Chemical Laboratories, Inc., 712 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir. 1983); Leadfree Enter. v. United
States Steel Corp., 711 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1983).
121. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1977).
mote manufacturer. Rather, this is a question that the UCC effec-
tively evades, leaving its resolution to the judiciary of each state that
adopts the UCC. 22 A recent treatise collects the results of the pro-
cess of state judicial decisionmaking that the UCC evidently in-
vites.123 While the slight majority of courts have ruled that without
privity a manufacturer is free of implied warranty liability, 2 4 there
is at least a significant minority position endorsing the extension of
implied warranty to the manufacturer. 125 Courts are more willing to
approve a warranty action against a remote manufacturer if the
product owner is seeking recovery for direct economic losses than if
she is suing for consequential damages, the vulnerability to which
varies widely according to the circumstances of the particular
owner.
126
In a number of economic loss cases, the absence of privity is what
evidently has motivated the plaintiff to attempt a products liability
claim against the manufacturer. 127 By and large, however, the case
law suggests that the vertical privity issue is capable of being over-
rated. In many economic loss cases, especially those involving large
monetary claims, the product owner is a business enterprise that has
purchased the product directly from the manufacturer. 128 Since the
product owner is in privity with the manufacturer, the manufacturer
is fully subject to the implied warranty claim of the owner. Other
cases involve more ordinary products purchased by the consumer
from a retailer. Personal injuries resulting from defective consumer
products can lead to staggering losses that are beyond the financial
resources of the retailer; yet the purely economic losses associated
with those products are likely to be no more than moderate in quan-
tity. Hence in most instances the consumer seeking compensation for
economic losses will regard the retailer as a sufficiently acceptable
defendant. Only when that retailer has gone out of business is verti-
cal privity likely to be a serious problem.
Having identified that problem, I can briefly offer my own views
as to its resolution. I recommend against the recognition of any verti-
cal privity limitation. The concept of a contract running from manu-
facturer to consumer is no legal fiction concocted by soft-minded tort
lawyers in the name of consumerism; to the contrary, that such a
contract meaningfully exists has been affirmed by just about all of
122. See id. § 2-318 official comment 3 (UCC "neutral" on privity issue).
123. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 94, at 405-10.
124. Id. at 407 & n.31.
125. Id. at 408 & n.32.
126. See id. at 409.
127. See, e.g., Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 129 Ariz. 574, 633 P.2d 383(1981).
128. See Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prod. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 221 n.6 (4th Cir.
1982).
[VOL 23: 37, 1986] Economic Loss
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the economists writing about problems of manufacturer liability. 29
The average consumer is rarely in a position to suffer consequential
losses such as loss of profits; 130 the consumer's economic losses typi-
cally consist of the direct costs of repair and replacement-costs
whose likelihood and magnitude the manufacturer can easily predict.
Moreover, given the recognized warranty actions by consumer
against retailer and then retailer against manufacturer, the con-
sumer has a strict liability right to receive compensation for eco-
nomic losses, a right to be ultimately funded by the original manu-
facturer. The unavailability of the retailer in an individual case
should neither deprive the consumer of his proper recovery nor pro-
tect the manufacturer from its proper liability.' 31 In short, not only
is the liability of the remote manufacturer the right result, but it is a
result that can be arrived at by resort to proper contract reasoning.
Apart from privity, the difference between products liability and
implied warranty most frequently mentioned by judges in economic
loss cases is the attitude towards disclaimers. 132 In many of the re-
ported cases in which the plaintiff seeks a tort recovery for economic
loss, a disclaimer is what apparently prevents the plaintiff from pro-
ceeding under a warranty theory. Sometimes, a seller, perhaps of
used products, disclaims warranty liability altogether.13 More com-
monly, the warranty is given but extends only to repair costs, exclud-
ing liability for consequential damages; 34 or, all warranty liability is
disclaimed after some stated period of time. 35 As noted, the Re-
statement expresses the view that products liability rights are not
subject to disclaimer.136 By contrast, implied warranty apparently
can be disclaimed as long as the contract language in the disclaimer
129. See, e.g., M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 95-104(1983).
130. See Speidel, supra note 120, at 317.
131. What about the limited number of cases in which the ultimate non-privity
purchaser does indeed suffer consequential damages? On the one hand, the manufacturer
is not in a position to obtain that knowledge of the purchaser's circumstances that is
required by the Hadley principle. See id.
Still, the retailer may well be liable for the consequential damages of the purchaser
under implied warranty, and implied warranty may then require the manufacturer to
reimburse the retailer. Economy in litigation is achieved, therefore, by rendering the
manufacturer liable in the direct suit of the purchaser.
132. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin, 626 F.2d at 288-89.
133. See, e.g., Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry City Spraying Serv., Inc.,
572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
134. See, e.g., Purvis, 674 F.2d at 217.
135. See, e.g., Gibson v. Reliable Chevrolet, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980).
136. See supra text accompanying note 65.
is clear and conspicuous.'3 7 This divergence of positions taken on the
issue of disclaimers might be thought to provide the strongest evi-
dence supporting the thesis that the choice between products liability
and implied warranty is at bottom a choice between contract and
tort. 38
The trouble is that the divergence may be more apparent than
actual. It is only in personal injury cases that courts have invalidated
products liability disclaimers,139 and even in these cases the rule
against disclaimers is not quite as firm as the Restatement sug-
gests.1 40 For that matter, in personal injury cases the UCC (availa-
ble to the plaintiff as an alternative theory) adopts a similar policy of
general, but not absolute, hostility to disclaimers: under the UCC,
disclaimer of liability for personal injury is "prima facie
unconscionable." 1 41
What about products liability claims for damage to property?
These are claims that the Seely rule explicitly allows; 142 and the
claimants in such cases are typically commercial buyers rather than
ordinary consumers. When a commercial plaintiff has sued in prod-
ucts liability for property damage, courts have generally proved will-
ing to give effect to liability disclaimers. 43 Moreover, even when the
plaintiff in a products liability property damage case is an ordinary
consumer, disclaimers have sometimes been upheld. In Labionco v.
Property Protection, Inc.,144 a fifty-five year-old divorcee living alone
came home one day to find that $35,000 of her jewelry had been
burglarized; she had previously purchased a burglar alarm system,
but a defect in that system disabled it from interfering with the bur-
glary. The court recognized that her case seemed to qualify under
products liability, since her permanent loss of her property in the
137. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977).
138. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 I1. 2d 69, 81-82, 435
N.E.2d 443, 448-49 (1982).
139. For citations, see Note, Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability, 69 VA. L.
Rav. 1111, 1117-18 nn.31-33 (1983).
140. The New York Court of Appeals has declined to rule that disclaimers are per
se invalid. Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 124-25, 305 N.E.2d
750, 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 623 (1973).
141. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1977).
142. See supra notes 69, 87-88 and accompanying text.
143. See Scandinavian Airlines v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir.
1979); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1979).
144. 292 Pa. Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417 (1981). Two other burglar alarm cases
involving commercial buyers in which limited disclaimers were likewise upheld are: Fire-
man's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Burns Elec. Sec. Servs., Inc., 93 Ill. App. 3d 298, 417
N.E.2d 131 (1980); Aronson's Men's Stores, Inc. v. Potter Elec. Signal Co. Inc., 632
S.W.2d 472 (Mo. 1982). All three opinions eventually explained that, notwithstanding
the plaintiff's exclusion from its property, products liability doctrine does not apply. But
this explanation served merely as a rationalization for the courts' conclusion that these
are cases in which disclaimers should be regarded as acceptable. See generally Annot.,
37 A.L.R. 4TH 47 (1985).
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burglary was tantamount to the destruction of that property. 145 Nev-
ertheless, the court gave effect to a provision in the sales contract
that limited the seller's liability to the direct cost of repairs. 46 Con-
cerned about the consequential loss problem, the court noted that the
homeowner best knows the value of her own property and can
purchase first-party insurance to cover the threat of its loss; 47 more-
over, prohibiting disclaimers would increase the price of alarm sys-
tems and effectuate an unfortunate subsidy running from less
wealthy to more wealthy burglar alarm households. 48
Consider now the suit by an ordinary consumer for pure economic
loss. This suit is properly covered by the UCC: while the draftsmen
of the UCC were primarily concerned with commercial transac-
tions, 49 it is nevertheless clear that the UCC applies to consumer
transactions in a very strong way. 50 Of all the sales transactions
that presently are governed by the UCC, undoubtedly a large major-
ity are consumer sales; and by now there are hundreds of appellate
opinions interpreting the UCC in cases that began with an ordinary
consumer transaction.
Yet even conceding the clear application of the UCC, there is
some uncertainty as to whether implied warranty can routinely be
disclaimed in consumer transactions. To begin with, the UCC invali-
dates all "unconscionable" clauses in contracts,' 5' and some courts
may conclude that a complete disclaimer of implied warranty in the
course of mass merchandising is unconscionable. 5 2 Secondly, a num-
ber of states, in adopting the UCC, have included provisions prohib-
iting the disclaimer of implied warranty in ordinary consumer
sales.'53 Additionally, even if courts, following the lead of Labionco,
145. Labionco, 292 Pa. Super. at 355-56, 437 A.2d at 422.
146. Id. at 359, 437 A.2d at 424.
147. Id. at 360-61, 437 A.2d at 424-25.
148. Id. at 361, 437 A.2d at 425.
149. See Speidel, supra note 120, at 309-10.
150. See Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in
Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 995 (1966).
151. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977).
152. See Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985) (disclaimer
given by seed distributor to small farmers found unconscionable); cf. Berg v. Stromme,
79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971) (disclaimer found contrary to public policy under
general commercial law). But see U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1977) (limitation of liability for
"commercial" loss is not "prima facie unconscionable").
153. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West Supp. 1983).
Washington has adopted an interesting intermediate position: a consumer disclaimer
must set forth "with particularity the qualities and characteristics which are not being
warranted." WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-719 (1985).
concur in the manufacturer's disclaimer of liability for consequential
losses, the economic losses of concern to ordinary consumers gener-
ally entail merely the moderate and predictable costs of repair and
replacement. The disclaimer of liability for even these costs might
strike a court (or a legislature) as unjustified or objectionable.1 54
In all, then, even though the question of disclaimability is an im-
portant one, its answer is by no means fully determined by the classi-
fication of the plaintiff's cause of action as either products liability or
implied warranty. In particular, even if courts should decide that
products liability does extend to claims of economic loss, in suits
brought by commercial buyers one can predict that products liability
would be held to be disclaimable after all. This prediction is roughly
supported, moreover, by the case law in New Jersey during the reign
of Santor 55 and by a recent ruling in Wisconsin,156 which is gener-
ally classified as a Santor jurisdiction.1 57
Having charted the uncertainties of the law on the issue of dis-
claimability of liability for economic loss, I can provide at least lim-
ited evaluation of the merits. I find no reason, first of all, for ques-
tioning the disclaimer received by a commercial purchaser; here,
conventional contract reasoning is sufficiently persuasive. As for or-
dinary consumers, one needs to know why courts are offended by
personal injury disclaimers in order to figure out whether economic
loss disclaimers are offensive as well. The court's objection may be
that a disclaimer is a prime example of a "contract of adhesion."
This objection would apply to personal injury disclaimers and eco-
nomic loss disclaimers alike; they would each be lacking in the at-
154. Under the federal Magnuson-Moss Act, approved by Congress in 1975, a
manufacturer is prohibited from disclaiming an implied warranty in every consumer
transaction in which the manufacturer provides a written express warranty. Magnuson-
Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1982). The manufacturer
may, however, limit its implied warranty to a "reasonable duration," if the limitation is
conscionable and set forth in clear and unmistakable language. Id. § 2308(b).
155. Monsanto Co., Inc. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90
(1974); Moreira Constr. Co. v. Moretrench Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 391, 235 A.2d 211
(1967), aff'd, 51 N.J. 405, 241 A.2d 236 (1968). See Note, Products Liability in Com-
mercial Transactions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1061, 1076-79 (1976).
156. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 373 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. Ct. App.
1985). See also the reasoning in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Washington Elec. Corp., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 737, 748-49, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (1976).
157. See supra note 79. In Seely jurisdictions, cases arise in which an exception to
the Seely rule permits a products liability claim for economic loss. Even in such cases,
judges have suggested that they will enforce an explicit liability disclaimer accepted by a
commercial purchaser. See, e.g., Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813,
817, reh'g denied, 738 F.2d 451 (11th Cir. 1984); East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval-Tur-
bine, Inc., 752 F.2d 903, 917 n.8 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 56 (1985) (Becker,
J., concurring and dissenting). See also Salt River Project Agricultural Imp. & Power
Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 385, 694 P.2d 198, 215 (1984) (prod-
ucts liability for economic loss cannot be "disclaimed" by boilerplate language, but it can
be contractually "waived").
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tributes of a "true" contract or agreement. How valid, however, is
this (assumed) judicial perception? In recent years, one article, in-
corporating an eclectic mix of insights, has advanced the idea that
adhesion contracts are nasty, widespread phenomena that should be
generally invalidated; 158 but another article, relying on a sophisti-
cated law-and-economics analysis, has concluded that the very no-
tion of adhesion contracts is intellectually shallow and empirically
false.159 I do not attempt, in this Article, to consider or resolve the
range of issues implicated in this vivid academic debate.
In any event, there is a second explanation for the judicial opposi-
tion to personal injury disclaimers. That explanation suggests that
ordinary people, operating under a variety of psychological limita-
tions, may be likely to do a particularly bad job in making decisions
about very low probability catastrophes.1 60 Here it is noteworthy that
even the UCC is generally opposed to liability disclaimers in the per-
sonal injury setting. 61 If the fear of consumers' lack of wisdom in
the face of personal injury "disasters"16 2 is what explains the pater-
nalistic position taken by both the Restatement and the UCC, then
in a case involving mere economic loss even a Santor advocate might
agree that a liability disclaimer is acceptable.
It may well be, therefore, that the literature surrounding the de-
bate about Seely has overstated the extent to which the choice be-
tween products liability and implied warranty controls the dis-
claimability issue. In that debate, it may also be that another issue
has received insufficient attention: in economic loss cases, what the
plaintiff may really need to watch out for is the statute of
limitations.
A products liability claim is governed by the jurisdiction's general
tort statute, which begins to run from the date of harm and fre-
quently expires after two years.16 3 The UCC limitation period for a
158. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173 (1983).
159. See Priest, supra note 10.
160. See G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 55-58 (1970).
161. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1977).
162. In defending the Seely rule, Judge Sneed has observed that "[tlo treat such a
breach [of warranty] as an accident is to confuse disappointment with disaster." S.M.
Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1376 (9th Cir. 1978).
163. The California statute sets a short one year period for personal injury claims,
and three years for property damage claims. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 340, 338 (West
Supp. 1985).
warranty action is four years.1 " Four years, however, from what
date? Section 2-725(1) of the UCC stipulates that the buyer's cause
of action "accrues," and the statute of limitation hence begins to
run, at the time of sale. In addition, section 2-725(2) of the UCC
states flatly that this accrual takes place "regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge" of the product defect' 65
Notice one irony: If a consumer suffers economic loss shortly after
purchasing the product, the limitation period afforded by the UCC,
four years from the sale, is more generous than the period applicable
to a products liability claim. In many cases, however, the product
owner does not begin to suffer economic loss until more than four
years have elapsed after the original product sale.1 66 In these cases,
plaintiffs are required to pursue products liability as a theory of last
resort.
It is hard to develop real enthusiasm for the UCC's apparent limi-
tation period policy. While the UCC's choice of a pro-seller accrual
rule can quite possibly be justified by various practical arguments,
the Official Comment to the UCC makes no serious effort to make
such a demonstration; it merely states that four years "is within the
normal commercial record keeping period. 1 67 If the point of limiting
a limitation period is to benefit defendants,1 68 and if the UCC gener-
ally relies on contractual or consensual values, then one would cer-
tainly expect that the four-year rule would be subject to modification
by an appropriate term in the sales contract itself. As it happens, the
relevant section of the UCC does authorize the parties, by an agree-
ment, to "reduce the period of limitation;"1 69 however, the same sec-
tion goes on to stipulate that the parties' agreement cannot "extend"
the limitation period.17 0 Nothing in the Official Comment in any way
explains or defends this language. No doubt, buyer and seller, if rep-
resented by shrewd counsel, could devise language that would cir-
cumvent this prohibition.17 1 Still, its curious presence in the UCC's
164. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1977).
165. Id. § 2-725(2).
166. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d
443 (1982).
Even if the limitation period has not yet expired, the product owner must still demon-
strate that a defect existed in the product at the time of sale. For a discussion of the
extent to which the "subsequent" malfunction or deterioration of the product is indica-
tive of an "original" defect, see Schwartz, New Products, supra note 64, at 828-36.
167. U.C.C. § 2-725 official comment (1977).
168. An alternative (but unpersuasive) idea is that the purpose of limitation stat-
utes is to protect the courts from being overly burdened by stale claims.
169. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1977) (emphasis added).
170. Id.
171. The parties could couch their agreement in terms of an express warranty as to
future performance. See id. § 2-725(2). Also, even if the limitation period cannot itself
be extended by contract, it is conceivable that the definition of accrual can be contractu-
ally modified.
66
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limitation-period section makes it all the more difficult to regard that
section as either praiseworthy or as an embodiment of contractual
values.
There is, however, an additional and intriguing complication. As
summarized by a leading treatise, under the UCC accrual provision
"the clock ticks even though the buyer does not know the goods are
defective.' ' 7 2 Yet notice section 2-725(4) of the UCC, which pro-
vides that the UCC "does not alter the law of tolling of the statute
of limitations." The Official Comment states this point even more
emphatically: there is no intent to "alter or modify in any respect the
law on tolling of the Statute of Limitations as it now prevails in the
various jurisdictions.' 73 Now, state law typically recognizes a num-
ber of circumstances that justify the "tolling" of limitation stat-
utes.17 4 In many jurisdictions, one such circumstance is the plaintiff's
lack of opportunity to "discover" the violation of his rights; in these
states, the statute is "tolled" until the time of the plaintiff's
discovery. 17 5
There is, then, an apparent discrepancy between the specific provi-
sions on accrual in section 2-725(1) and (2) and the general lan-
guage on tolling in section 2-725(4). To be sure, a large number of
courts, evidently not noticing section 2-725(4), have simply assumed
that the four-year rule is to be applied without qualification in eco-
nomic loss cases. 17 6 Moreover, even the judge who recognizes the dis-
crepancy could very plausibly argue that the specific ought to take
precedence over the general, and that a "ticking clock" is therefore
altogether warranted. This argument is not, however, an automatic
winner, given the breadth of the "in any respect" language of the
Official Comment, and given the extent to which this language has
not been actually confronted by the courts that have applied a flat
four-year rule. At the very least, section 2-725(4) confers on courts
the de facto discretion as to whether to incorporate the discovery
172. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 94, at 418.
173. U.C.C. § 2-725 official comment (1977).
174. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1177, 1203-04, 1220-37 (1950).
175. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 146 (1970) (citing early cases).
The so-called discovery rule has become increasingly popular in recent years. My as-
sumption, which could of course be challenged, is that § 2-725(4), despite the "now
prevails" language in its Official Comment, incorporates all of a jurisdiction's tolling
rules, even those that the jurisdiction first recognizes subsequent to its adoption of the
UCC.
176. See, e.g., County of Johnson v. United States Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284,
292 (E.D. Tenn. 1984).
idea into the UCC.'77 In exercising this discretion, a Michigan opin-
ion can perhaps be read as rejecting the discovery rule; 178 yet one
California court has endorsed the rule,179 and an Illinois court has
left the issue open. 80
What the right statute of limitations period should be in an eco-
nomic loss action can be regarded as an open question. An initial
and important point is that nothing inherent in the concept of either
"tort" or "contract" provides firm guidance in resolving this ques-
tion. A distinction between personal injury and economic loss is
somewhat more promising. Again, personal injury may well entail
"disaster" in a way that economic loss does not;18 ' accordingly, a
short limitation period for economic loss claims is less likely to pro-
duce extreme hardship than a short limitation period for cases of
personal injury.' 82 Additionally, a personal injury generally happens
all at one time, and that time is frequently a long time after the
original product sale. Economic loss is much more likely to begin
early and then continue on, as in Spring Motors;'8 this makes a
shorter limitation period more acceptable.18 4 Also, the generosity of
the tort limitation statute in products cases is essentially inadvertent:
for the typical statute was undoubtedly drafted with standard tort
177. Consider UCC § 1-103, which indicates that general legal principles, "unless
displaced" by the UCC, can be used to "supplement" the UCC. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977).
In dozens of opinions, courts have behaved aggressively in exercising their § 1-103 au-
thority. See, e.g., Northwest Potato Sales, Inc. v. Beck, 678 P.2d 1138 (Mont. 1984)(doctrine of "estoppel by silence" enables a party to avoid the UCC version of the statute
of frauds).
178. Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 395 Mich. 271, 235 N.W.2d 570 (1975).
179. Werber v. Mercedes-Benz of North Am., 152 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 765 (1984) (decertified). On appeal, the supreme court denied a rehearing, but
ordered the decertification of the court of appeal opinion. A decertified opinion cannot be
cited as judicial precedent in California; decertification typically indicates that there is
something in the lower court opinion that the supreme court does not want preserved.
But the Weber opinion contains an abundance of holdings; hence it is quite difficult to
interpret the significance of its decertification.
180. Tomes v. Chrysler Corp., 60 Ii. App. 3d 707, 377 N.E.2d 224 (1978).
181. See supra note 162.
182. That is, product-produced economic losses are likely to be a function of prod-
uct owners' pre-existing wealth in a way that product-produced personal injuries are not.
Of course, this point is true only as a tendency or generalization: in individual cases, a
"small" consumer can easily experience a "large" economic loss. But of course the law
often (and properly) proceeds by way of generalizations.
183. Given the timing of its lawsuit, the plaintiff's implied warranty claim in
Spring Motors was barred by the UCC limitation period. Yet the plaintiff in that case
knew the product was defective within four months of its acquisition by the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff's economic losses reached their peak three years after product delivery. 98
N.J. at 562-64, 489 A.2d at 663-64. The subsequent delay of the plaintiff in bringing suit
seems bizarre; hence the actual application of the UCC limitation period to the Spring
Motors defendant did not work any real hardship. To this extent, Spring Motors was a
poor vehicle for the New Jersey court to employ in pondering that limitation period.
184. See Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 395 Mich. 271, 278, 235 N.W. 2d 570, 573
(1975).
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situations in mind, in which there is no extended duration between
the act of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff.185 In recently
assessing the unusual situation of modern products liability, many
state legislatures have enacted so-called "statutes of repose," cutting
off the victim's right to a personal injury recovery once a certain
number of years have elapsed after the original product sale.8 6
None of these repose periods is shorter than six years,187 however;
and courts in several states have ruled that repose provisions are un-
constitutionally harsh. 88 In a recent article, I considered such stat-
utes of repose and concluded that their wisdom turned on empirical
facts, including the number of valid personal injury claims that they
foreclose, the number of weak or dubious claims that manufacturers
would otherwise be required to defend against, and the cost to manu-
facturers of preparing for and engaging in such defensive efforts.'89
Since the relevant data were simply not available, I found myself
unable to pass intelligent judgment on the repose statutes. 90 Since
comparable data are equally lacking for economic loss claims, I am
likewise in a poor position to determine whether to support the
UCC's four-year period or how to advise courts on the exercise of
their section 2-725 discretion.
In any event, my reference to the statute of limitations completes
the inventory of noteworthy potential differences between products
liability and implied warranty. What is it about the UCC that has
persuaded most courts to follow Seely and reject the idea that prod-
ucts liability applies to economic losses? Seely courts are inclined to
describe the UCC as a solution to the economic loss problem that is
based in "sound policy;" 191 in Seely, Justice Traynor relied on the
observation that UCC rules "function well" in an economic loss set-
ting. 92 Language of this sort implies an intelligence rationale behind
Seely: the UCC is given priority because of the general intelligence
it displays. Notice, however, that the supposed good sense of the
UCC is not easily detected in two of the areas where products liabil-
ity and the UCC may diverge: privity, and the statute of limitations.
185. See Schwartz, New Products, supra note 64, at 815, 842-43.
186. See id. citations at 842-43.
187. See id. at 842-43 & nn.283-85.
188. See, e.g., Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981).
189. See Schwartz, New Products, supra note 64, at 842-51, 862.
190. See id. at 846.
191. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 78, 435 N.E.2d 443,
447 (1982). See Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 335, 581 P.2d 784,
793 (1978) (UCC "carefully and painstakingly" responds to economic loss problem).
192. 63 Cal. 2d at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
On the privity issue, as noted, the UCC simply abdicates: it autho-
rizes state courts to reach any conclusion they please.193 As for the
limitations period, leaving aside its possible ambiguity, one is unable
to readily affirm that the "policy" here achieved by the UCC is obvi-
ously "sound."
In all, I am not inclined to accept the idea that it is the UCC's
superior intelligence that justifies the courts in subordinating prod-
ucts liability to the UCC in economic loss cases. There is, however, a
second and more convincing argument on behalf of that subordina-
tion. This argument relates to authority rather than intelligence. The
UCC has pertinence in the first place precisely because it has been
enacted into law by the legislatures of almost every state; and under
elemental jurisprudence, legislation takes precedence over the com-
mon law. Whether or not the UCC is an intelligent document, it is a
legislative document, and that is largely all that matters.19 4 The
courts' obligation to abide by legislative judgments obviously pro-
vides the strongest support for the Seely idea that products liability
doctrine cannot be applied to problems of economic loss.
In this regard, however, consider again the issue of privity. As
noted, the UCC reserves the resolution of that issue for the state
judiciary.'9 5 That legislative decisions are superior to judicial deci-
sions in no way explains, therefore, why implied warranty should
take precedence over products liability as far as privity is concerned.
Here, however, an alternative explanation is available. Consider a
state, such as Alaska, whose highest court is asked, in a case like
Murrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc.,196 to rule on whether or not the
consumer's implied warranty right runs against a remote manufac-
turer. If a court, after considering all relevant policy factors, chooses
to rule that a remote manufacturer should be free of implied war-
ranty claims, then the court's obvious interest in preventing the ef-
fective circumvention of its ruling should lead that court to reject the
products liability doctrine in economic loss settings. 97 Also, if the
court decides in favor of the implied warranty liability of the manu-
facturer, then the court has expanded the warranty theory in a way
193. See supra text accompanying note 122.
194. An utterly irrational statute is unconstitutional; the UCC is hardly irrational
in this sense. Statutes that are somewhat stupid or obsolescent are likely to be circum-
vented by the courts. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982). The UCC plainly does not come within this description.
195. See supra text accompanying note 122.
196. 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
197. A somewhat similar analysis pertains to the tolling problem in the statute of
limitations. If a state court determines that the manufacturer's interest in closing its
books renders the discovery rule inadvisable in an implied warranty action, it would be
surprising if that same court were willing to frustrate the manufacturer's efforts at book-
closing by enabling the product owner to sue for economic loss under a products liability
theory.
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that reduces the significance of the Seely-Santor products liability
debate. 98 This, as it happens, aptly describes Spring Motors, in
which a New Jersey court, though depriving commercial buyers of
their products liability claims, also ruled that such a buyer can bring
an implied warranty claim against a non-privity remote supplier. 99
The court emphasized that this expanded implied warranty right
serves as a substitute for the products liability right previously sug-
gested by Santor.0 °
Notice, in addition, that even my general point about legislative
superiority requires some amplification. 0 1 Prior to the enactment of
the UCC, implied warranty principles had been applied by the
courts to cases of personal injury; moreover, by virtue of late amend-
ments, the final version of the UCC included provisions that specifi-
cally addressed the problem of personal injury.20 2 There is therefore
room for the argument that even in personal injury actions products
liability doctrine is preempted by the UCC; several conscientious
scholars have indeed found this argument persuasive.20 3 However,
the UCC's specific provisions on personal injury were added at the
last minute, and mainly as an effort to keep up with the recent devel-
opments within the law of torts.204 Additionally, at the time the
UCC was drafted, common law principles had already achieved ma-
jor application in personal injury and property damage cases; 205 and
there is no evidence that the UCC's draftsmen entertained any idea
that they were abrogating these well-established common law appli-
cations. Accordingly, the proper conclusion is that in personal injury
cases implied warranty and products liability are available to the
consumer as alternative theories. Certainly, this is the conclusion
198. See Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 161 n.5
(Minn. 1981). In Murrow, the court accepted the Seely rule of no tort liability, but only
after affirming the liability of the manufacturer under implied warranty, at least for the
direct economic losses of the consumer.
199. 98 N.J. at 582, 489 A.2d at 674.
200. Id. at 586, 489 A.2d at 676 (implied warranty, as extended by Spring Mo-
tors, "parallels" a Santor tort claim).
201. In a few states, the common law doctrine of products liability has been codi-
fied. For citations, see Note, supra note 117, at 1352 n.46.
202. See narrative in Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury
and Article 2 of the U.C.C., 48 Mo. L. REV. 1, 9 (1983).
203. Citations to the literature are collected id. at 3-4 n.11.
204. See U.C.C. § 2-318 official comment 3 (1977); Wade, supra note 202, at 9.
But see the early UCC history described in Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability:
A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEG.
STUD. 461 (1985).
205. See W. PROSSER, supra note 73, at 498-503.
that almost all the American courts have seen fit to accept, if usually
implicitly.206 Economic loss, by contrast, lies at the center of the
UCC's intended coverage; and prior to the UCC there was utterly no
record of applying tort law to claims of economic loss resulting from
defective products.20 7 Not surprisingly, then, even those scholars who
are keenest on arguing that the UCC does not preempt the common
law in personal injury cases have been equally keen on insisting that
the UCC does enjoy exclusive jurisdiction in economic loss cases.208
At this point, one can appreciate the position that the New Jersey
Supreme Court now finds itself in as a result of Spring Motors,
which left open the question of the Santor rights of the ordinary
consumer. In refusing to allow commercial buyers to sue in products
liability, Spring Motors partly relied on what has here been referred
to as an intelligence rationale: because commercial buyers have "suf-
ficient bargaining power," 209 the UCC, which was "carefully-con-
ceived, 21 provides a "more appropriate vehicle" for resolving eco-
nomic loss claims, one that satisfies the relevant "policy
considerations. 2 11 Elsewhere in Spring Motors, however, the court
emphasized an authority rationale for its holding: a court is obliged
to recognize "the role of the Legislature" and to honor legislative
judgments.212 What result the New Jersey court will reach in a later
ordinary consumer case will depend on how it maneuvers between
these two rationales. If, in that later case, the court emphasizes the
intelligence rationale, the court could plausibly justify a pro-Santor
result by stressing that the UCC is not sufficiently intelligent in its
application to ordinary consumers, since they are in an "unequal
bargaining position. 21 3 Yet as long as the court acknowledges that
the authority rationale is what mandates Spring Motors, then the
extension of Spring Motors to ordinary consumers seems equally
mandatory, given the strong application of the UCC to consumer
transactions.1 4
The Seely plaintiff was in fact a private individual, though he was
evidently running his own business; in announcing the general Seely
206. For discussion, see Wade, supra note 202, at 6. The few explicit holdings are
collected in Annot., 15 A.L.R. 4TH 791 (1982).
207. See Franklin, supra note 150, at 983.
208. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 202, at 26 n.87.
209. 98 N.J. at 576, 489 A.2d at 671.
210. Id. at 577, 489 A.2d at 671.
211. Id. at 586, 489 A.2d at 689.
212. Id. at 577, 489 A.2d at 671.
213. Id. at 567, 489 A.2d at 666.
214. In the economic loss setting, nothing in the historical record would support
any argument that the UCC is less exclusive when applied to ordinary consumer claims
than in its application to the claims of commercial buyers. But see Justice Peters' Seely
dissent, 63 Cal. 2d at 27-28, 403 P.2d at 157-58, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30 (Peters, J.,
dissenting).
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rule, Justice Traynor did not regard the precise status of the plaintiff
as pertinent.215 My analysis up until now reveals my assessment that
Seely basically reaches the right result. Yet even in Seely jurisdic-
tions, economic loss claims have occasionally arisen in circumstances
that have produced some uncertainty as to whether the Seely rule
remains appropriate.216 Almost all of these cases have involved a
commercial or institutional product owner.21 In order to give my
treatment of the cases a sufficient basis or anchor, I shall assume
that the explanation for the owner's inability to rely on the implied
warranty doctrine relates to a disclaimer in the contract of sale, a
disclaimer that is clearly valid under implied warranty but whose
validity would be questionable under products liability. 21a As noted,
the owner has a well-established products liability claim if the defect
in the product causes damage to property. This is so, at least, if the
property damaged is something other than the purchased product.
What should the result be when the property damaged is merely that
product itself? In Seely, Justice Traynor seemed to affirm, if some-
what inarticulately, that the owner can recover in products liability
under these circumstances.21 9 Other courts, however, have reached a
contrary conclusion,220 and theirs is the result that appears clearly
correct. In terms of its impact on the owner, damage to the product
215. Justice Peters, dissenting in Seely, identified the plaintiff as an "ordinary con-
sumer" who was not in "the world of commerce," and relied on this identification in
arguing in favor of the plaintiff's products liability recovery for economic loss. Id.
216. One court has charged that the Seely rule is "riddled with exceptions" in a
way that renders it unacceptable. Emerson G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan Enter., 732 F.2d
1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984). Since I recommend rejection of most of the exceptions, I can
dismiss the charge.
217. This is hardly a coincidence. Such owners tend to purchase products that are
sufficiently expensive, and sufficiently involved in income-generating activities, as to make
litigation sensible if the product malfunctions.
218. -Disclaimers do, in fact, provide the explanation for the products liability
claims in many of the cases under review here. Often, however, judicial opinions deal
with the Seely issue in the abstract; they do not emphasize or regard as legally relevant
the actual reason for the apparent unavailability of implied warranty. The Spring Mo-
tors opinion, for example, carefully discussed the UCC provisions concerning privity, no-
tice, and disclaimers. 98 N.J. at 565-66, 489 A.2d at 665. From this discussion one
would hardly guess that it was the UCC's statute of limitations that actually blocked the
plaintiff's claim.
219. In Seely, a defect in the plaintiff's truck allegedly damaged that truck. The
truck was the product that the defendant-manufacturer had previously sold to the plain-
tiff, via a retailer. The court indicated that if the plaintiff could prove his allegation, a
products liability claim would be in order for the truck damage. 63 Cal. 2d at 19, 403
P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
220. See, e.g., Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc.,
572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
purchased seems functionally equivalent to product breakdown or
the mere failure of the product to perform; furthermore, the line-
drawing involved in separating out damage to the product from mere
internal breakdown or deterioration seems clearly unsatisfactory.
There is no reason not to honor the (hypothesized) disclaimer.
In many situations, however, the malfunction that damages the
product itself will likewise result either in a personal injury or in
damage to the plaintiff's other property. Since products liability doc-
trine plainly applies to that personal injury or property damage, the
question is whether it remains sensible to apply warranty doctrine to
the economic loss portion of the plaintiff's claim. The Oregon Su-
preme Court has concluded that it "seems [unacceptably] artificial"
to apply products liability doctrine to most of the plaintiff's loss but
not to the remainder;221 however, Texas law evidently requires the
segregation of the product owner's products liability claim for prop-
erty damage and his implied warranty claim for economic loss. 222 In
appraising cases of this sort, one should be concerned about both the
relative and the absolute magnitude of the plaintiffs losses.223 Con-
sider, first of all, an expensive combine purchased by a peanut
farmer which, in the course of breaking down completely, manages
to mangle a limited number of the farmer's peanuts;224 it would be
absurd to hold that the sad fate of those peanuts enables the farmer
to escape the UCC (and the disclaimer) in his suit complaining
about the ill-performing combine. Ponder, secondly, a defective new
roof which needs to be replaced at a cost of $50,000, but which also
damages the pre-existing eaves of the structure, necessitating repairs
that cost $985. In assessing these facts, a Wisconsin court concluded
that the "association" of property damage with economic loss enti-
tles the plaintiff to sue for all of his losses under a products liability
theory.225 Yet while $985 is more than a trivial sum, it forms only a
small part of the plaintiff's overall claim; the Wisconsin opinion thus
unintelligently allows the tail to wag the dog.
Consider next the situation in which the product is defective in a
way that creates a risk of serious personal injury. This defect meets
the standard set by the Restatement of "unreasonably dangerous. 2 26
Should the product defect be itself regarded as the fundamental ju-
221. Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 593, 575 P.2d 1383, 1386 (1978).
222. Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242, 1247, reh'g denied,
629 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1980) (discussing Texas law).
223. Such an analysis is suggested by Salt River Project Agricultural Imp. &
Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 380, 694 P.2d 198, 210 (1984).
224. See Mercer v. Long Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 61, reh'g denied, 671 F.2d 946 (5th
Cir. 1982).
225. See City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroder & Assocs., Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 38,
44, 240 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1976).
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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ridical fact, thereby entitling the product owner who happens to suf-
fer economic loss on account of the defect to invoke products liability
doctrine? No opinion adopts such a position, although several opin-
ions can be interpreted as at least flirting with it.227
Now add in, however, the further fact that the economic losses of
the owner actually consist of the costs of repairing or replacing the
product so as to eliminate its safety hazard. 28 Though the costs the
owner bears obviously do not amount to a "disaster," in a number of
ways the products liability claim of the owner is worthy of interest.
Not only is the product "unreasonably dangerous," but the safety
repairs are in a sense the factual substitute for the accident that
otherwise would have happened and that would have subjected the
manufacturer to a full products liability burden. In England, Lord
Denning has expressed his view that a negligent manufacturer
should be liable in tort for the cost of safety repairs. 2 In America,
the case law has been slow in developing, although a recent Alaska
opinion can be read as adopting a Denning-like position. 30 In these
situations, it is arguable that nullifying the disclaimer will encourage
the owner to undertake repairs, thereby advancing the strong prod-
ucts liability interest in safety. Yet the product owner who neglects
needed repairs knows that he subjects himself either to a disabling
personal injury or to huge personal liability in the event of a third-
party injury. Given the incentives afforded by these prospects, it is
far from obvious that any concern for safety justifies the invalidation
of the disclaimer.231
In one category of cases, however, American courts have been ea-
ger to recognize an exception to the Seely rule. In these cases, not
only is the product unreasonably dangerous and not only does the
227. For example, in Industrial Uniform Rental Co. v. International Harvester
Co., 317 Pa. Super. 65, 463 A.2d 1085 (1983), the absence of an "unreasonable danger"
in a product was found to be the key preventing the plaintiff from invoking products
liability.
228. This is the situation in many. pending cases in which public authorities are
suing asbestos companies because of the great expenses they have incurred in removing
asbestos from the walls and ceilings of public buildings. See Flaherty, Second Wave of
Litigation Hits Asbestos, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 29, 1984, at 1, col. 1. In these cases, the
plaintiffs are typically arguing that the UCC limitation period has been tolled by the
companies' fraudulent concealments of the defendants.
229. Dutton v. Bognor Regis, Urban Dist. Council, 1 Q.B. 373, 396 (C.A. 1972).
The English cases, many involving buildings rather than products, are discussed in Cane,
Physical Loss, Economic Loss, and Products Liability, 95 LAW Q. REV. 117, 129-37
(1979).
230. Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 463-64 (Alaska 1983).
231. See my discussion in Schwartz, supra note 60, at 710-12.
product itself suffer damage, but it does so because of a "sudden and
calamitous occurrence, ' 232 an occurrence that easily could have re-
sulted in a serious personal injury (though in fact such an injury is
fortunately avoided). Faced with such an "occurrence," almost every
American jurisdiction that has considered the question has permitted
the product owner to secure a products liability recovery.233 These
courts evidently have concluded that the event should be regarded as
the primary juridical fact; the nature of the plaintiff's loss has hence
been disregarded as a mere fortuity. What these courts are effec-
tively saying is that "it looks like a tort, it sounds like a tort, it must
be a tort." If my tone here sounds satiric, it is intended to be so. In
these suits it can (and should) be observed that the product buyer is
a corporate buyer that is not even capable of itself suffering personal
injury. Hence the fact that the corporation is suing for economic loss
rather than for personal injury should be regarded as essential rather
than fortuitous. If, in the corporation's suit against the manufacturer
the issue is a disclaimer that the corporation has seen fit to accept,
the corporation should not be relieved of the burden of that dis-
claimer merely because some independent person enjoyed a fortunate
escape from injury.
Finally, what happens if the plaintiff does not rely on the strict
liability doctrine, but rather alleges negligence on the part of the
manufacturer? Most courts, conceiving of Seely as expressing a gen-
eral tort rule, have concluded that an allegation of manufacturer
negligence does not entitle the plaintiff to an economic loss recov-
ery.234 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Spring Motors, has nowjoined this judicial majority.235 However, the Washington Supreme
Court relying on the general jurisprudence of negligence liability,
has found no "compelling reasons" to deny a plaintiff an economic
loss recovery against a negligent manufacturer.236 In Seely, Justice
Traynor, in discussing the strict liability issue, explicitly assumed
that negligence law would furnish no basis for an economic loss re-
covery. 237 But the California Supreme Court's recent J'Aire opinion,
creating a generic tort for the negligent infliction of economic harm,
has called into question Justice Traynor's assumption. Quite re-
232. The phrase was first used in Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251
(Alaska 1977).
233. The cases as of 1981 are discussed in Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Cat-
erpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981). Later cases include Vaughn v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 102 111. 2d 431, 466 N.E.2d 195 (1984). This new rule is referred to
sympathetically in Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 580, 489 A.2d at 673.
234. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d
443 (1982).
235. 98 N.J. at 579-82, 489 A.2d at 672-74.
236. Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 588, 555 P.2d 818, 822
(1976).
237. 63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
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cently, two California courts of appeal have interpreted J'Aire as
permitting the consumer to recover for economic losses by proving
the negligence of the manufacturer. 3 In light of the direction of the
original Santor-Seely debate, one should observe the irony: at pre-
sent, a commercial plaintiff can secure a tort recovery more easily in
California than it can in New Jersey.
In ascertaining the significance of negligence, everything depends
on how one characterizes what the strict products liability rule is all
about. Products liability is regarded by many as a revolutionary doc-
trine, resting on innovative policies.2 9 In the minds of others, how-
ever, one key to the strict liability doctrine lies in the generally high
correlation between defective products and manufacturer negligence,
a correlation that makes it not worth the time and trouble to justify
a full-blown case-by-case inquiry into the negligence issue.240 Under
the latter view, for Seely purposes the willingness or ability of the
plaintiff to prove some negligence on the part of the manufacturer
should not make much of a difference. Indeed, given the correlation
between defect and negligence, to endorse a negligence exception to
Seely would be to authorize the circumvention of the Seely doctrine
in most instances. Additionally, if the purpose of the Seely rule is, as
it certainly seems to be, to give proper recognition to the legislative
adoption of the UCC, then again the circumstance of manufacturer
negligence is lacking in relevance. 41
This suggests the overall moral of the story. If products liability
were the only game in town, if it were the product owner's exclusive
opportunity for recovery, then the Seely-related issue would be richly
significant in terms of such ultimate epistemological questions as
"What is tort?;" in particular, I could consider with great sympathy
the "sudden and calamitous occurrence" test that has been described
above. But the basic point of the Seely rule is that products liability
does not operate in a vacuum, for warranty law confers on product
owners broad statutory rights respecting their economic losses. If the
American legal community wishes to debate the issues of privity, dis-
claimability, and the proper limitation period in economic loss cases,
there is no reason why that debate cannot and should not be under-
238. Ales-Peratis Foods Int'l, Inc. v. American Can Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 277,
209 Cal. Rptr. 917, modified, 164 Cal. App. 3d 126 (1985). Pisano v. American Leasing,
146 Cal. App. 3d 194, 194 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1983).
239. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 204.
240. See, e.g., Schwartz, New Products, supra note 64, at 810.
241. For an expression of a contrary view, see Franklin, supra note 150, at 984-85,
1019.
taken under the auspices of the UCC, insofar as the UCC is capable
of judicial interpretation (and likewise of state legislative
amendment).
CONCLUSION
In J'Aire, the problem before the California Supreme Court was
one of accommodating tort and contract. In Seely, the problem fac-
ing the court was essentially one of properly subordinating common
law to statutory law. In Seely, the court acknowledged its problem
and withheld the common law accordingly. In J'Aire, the court ig-
nored the problem and consequently issued an unsatisfying opinion.
Of course, the court has the right to its own opinion, and from a
descriptive standpoint J'Aire is important in revealing the vitality of
the negligence principle in American law.242 Yet from a normative
standpoint J'Aire likewise suggests the potential for vacuity in the
negligence principle.
In evaluating J'Aire, one can wonder about the possibilities for
creative collaboration between contract and tort. The common law
lacks the authority to engage in any equivalent collaboration with
statutory law. But statutes in their implementation generally call for
judicial interpretation, and this is particularly true of the UCC,
which was drafted with the common law in mind, and whose rele-
vant provisions may be surprisingly ambivalent or indecisive. More-
over, even if courts were to hold that the products liability theory
somehow applies in economic loss cases, they might see fit, in so ap-
plying the doctrine, to modify some of its usual accoutrements. Ac-
cordingly, the extent to which implied warranty and products liabil-
ity actually diverge in economic loss cases remains ultimately a
matter for judicial choice. In all, we have misallocated our scholarly
energies; rather than agonizing about the abstract and somewhat
glamorous Santor-Seely debate, we should have been working more
constructively with such particular questions as what the most intel-
ligent limitation period is for cases in which defective products occa-
sion economic loss.
In sum, J'Aire and Seely each permits an interesting case study in
the application of tort doctrine to elements of economic loss. What
the two case studies together suggest is that the propriety of this
application frequently depends on the relationship between tort rules
and the doctrines at work in other areas of the law. The tort tunnel
vision that characterizes both J'Aire and Santor (the pre-1985 New
Jersey alternative to Seely) is not to be recommended.
242. See Schwartz, supra note 47.
